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The State Constitutional Right to Privacy Conflicts 
with Tax Reporting Requirements: The Florida 
Model 
Daniel R. Gordon* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The State of Florida's urgent need to improve the effectiveness of 
its state tax collection system1 conflicts with the Florida state constitu-
tional right to privacy. 2 Like many "sunbelt states," Florida is exper-
iencing strong population growth. 3 Current projections indicate that the 
recent population explosion will continue over the next twenty years.'' 
The Florida state government is faced with the challenge of expanding 
services in order to keep pace.5 To do so, Florida must raise more tax 
revenues. 6 One readily available way to increase tax revenues is to im-
prove the efficiency of collecting already existing taxes. In 19857 and 
• Associate Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law, Miami, Florida. 
I. The urgent need to improve tax collection arises not only from population growth creating 
strains on government services (See infra notes 2-5 and accompanying text) but also from legal 
and political constraints on the state authority to tax. Florida restricts the use of income and 
inheritance taxes. See FLA. CoNST. art. vn) § 5. The citizens of Florida politically resist new 
taxes even in the face of a growing awareness of the need to improve services. See THE JouRNAL 
OF THE SENATE, Number 2 - Special Session B, September 22, 1987 (recording the start of a 
special session of the Florida Legislature devoted to repealing or weakening the newly enacted 
sales tax on services). 
2. FLA. CoNST. art. I, § 23. 
3. See BuREAU oF THE CENsus, U.S. DEPT OF CoMMt:RCE, PuB. No. PC80-I-AI, 1980 
CENSUS OF POPULATION, NUMBER OF INHABITANTS, UNITED STATES SUMMARY, at 1-43 
(1983). Florida grew from 4,951,560 people in 1960 to 9,746,324 in 1980. 
4. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT OF CENSUS, SERIES P-25, No. 937 PROVI-
SIONAL PROJECTIONS OF THE PoPULATION OF STATES, BY AGE AND SEX: 1980 TO 2000, at II, 
(1983). Florida will grow to 13,316,000 inhabitants by 1990 and 17,438,000 inhabitants by 2000. 
5. A recent example of the state's struggle to keep pace with population growth is the 1987 
special session of the Florida Legislature which was devoted to overcoming prison overcrowding. 
See FLORIDA STATE SENATE jOURNAL, Number 1 - Special Session A (Wed. Feb. 4, 1987). 
Prison overcrowding arises from a number of sources, but certainly the growth in population plays 
a role. 
6. A dramatic example of the State's commitment to raise more tax revenues are the amend-
ments to the State sales tax abolishing large numbers of exemptions. See 1987 Florida Laws, 
Chapter 87-72. 
7. See 1985 Fla. Laws 85-342, § 4. 
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1986,8 the Florida Legislature amended the state intangible personal 
property tax in order to assure that more Floridians pay that tax. 
The Legislature enhanced financial data reporting requirements,9 
enabling the State of Florida to learn more about the finances and as-
sets of individuals and corporations. 10 The expanding capabilities of the 
state government to gain more personal information means less privacy 
protection for personal financial information. 11 This expansion of state 
power to discover personal information collides with the state constitu-
tional protection of individual privacy. 12 Following is a short overview 
of the intangible property tax, 13 an examination of the enhanced data 
reporting requirements/4 an overview of the Florida constitutional pro-
vision protecting privacy/11 and an analysis of how the enhanced re-
porting requirements violate the state constitutional privacy provision. 16 
II. THE FLORIDA INTANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY TAX 
The Florida intangible personal property tax17 raises over 
$250,000,000 in revenues for state government. 18 The Florida Depart-
ment of Revenue19 administers the tax, making collections and taking 
enforcement steps when the tax is not paid.20 The tax is paid either on 
an annual basis21 or a non-recurring basis.22 Subject to taxation is all 
personal property "which is not itself intrinsically valuable, but which 
derives its chief value from that which it represents .... " 23 This is a 
tax on negotiable paper and other "symbols" of equity, debt, and cer-
tain real property obligations. 
8. See 1986 Fla. Laws 86-152. 
9. /d. 
10. See infra notes 43-48 and accompanying text. 
11. See infra notes 49-73 and accompanying text. 
12. FLA. CoNST. art. I, § 23. 
13. See infra notes 17-42 and accompanying text. 
14. See infra notes 43-73 and accompanying text. 
15. See infra notes 74-161 and accompanying text. 
16. See infra notes 162-227 and accompanying text. 
17. FLA. STAT.,§ 199 (1987). Chapter 199 is known as the "Intangible Personal Property 
Tax Act". FLA. STAT. § 199.012 (1987). 
18. See BuREAU oF EcoNOMIC AND BusiNESS RESEARCH, CoLLEGE OF BusiNEss ADMINIS-
TRATION, UNIVt:RSITY OF FLORIDA, 1986 FLORIDA STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, at 561. The reve-
nues from the intangible property tax are deposited in a separate trust fund, and are disbursed for 
a variety of government services including the collection of a number of taxes by the Department 
of Revenue, revenue sharing with the counties, and services paid for by the State's General Reve-
nue Fund. 
19. FLA. STAT. § 199.023(5) (Supp. 1988). 
20. FLA. STAT. § 199.202 (1987). 
21. FLA. STAT. § 199.052 (1987). 
22. FLA. STAT. § 199.133 (1987). 
23. FLA. STAT. § 199.023 (Supp. 1988). 
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The taxable property includes stocks,2" business trusts, 211 mutual 
funds, 26 notes,27 bonds,28 accounts receivable,29 and a restricted class of 
real property leaseholds.30 Excluded from taxation are cash, franchises, 
partnership interests, certain government obligations, certain retirement 
assets, and restricted classes of other notes, assets, and obligations. 31 An 
annual tax of one mill32 is imposed on each dollar of intangible per-
sonal property owned, controlled, or managed33 by individuals, corpo-
rations, partnerships, and others3" who are legal residents of Florida on 
January P 11 or who on January 1, regardless of domicile, have an in-
tangible property interest with a business situs in Florida.36 The due 
date for the annual tax is June 30.37 
The annual tax is based on the value of intangible property as of 
January 1.38 Exempt from the annual tax are "notes, bonds, and other 
obligations for the payment of money which are secured by mortgage, 
deed of trust, or other lien upon real property situated in the state."39 
Such intangible property is subject to a two mill non-recurring tax."0 
This taxation scheme requires that the Department of Revenue 
learn of the existence and location of intangible personal property and 
certain real property interests."1 Such data collection is an onerous and 
complex task, and the Florida Legislature has granted the Department 
of Revenue the means to collect and enforce the intangible personal 
property tax. 42 
24. FLA. STAT. § 199.023(1)(a) (Supp. 1988). 
25. /d. 
26. /d. 
27. FLA. STAT. § 199.023(1)(b) (Supp. 1988). 
28. ld. 
29. !d. 
30. "All condominium and cooperative apartment leases of recreation facilities, land leases, 
and leases of other commonly used facilities." FLA. STAT. § 199.023(1)(c) (Supp. 1988). 
31. FLA. STAT.§ 199.185 (1987). 
32. FLA. STAT. § 199.032 (1987). 
33. FLA. STAT. § 199.052(1) (1987). 
34. /d. and FLA. STAT. § 199.023(3) (Supp. 1988). 
35. FLA. STAT. § 199.052(1) (1987). 
36. ld. 
37. FLA. STAT. § 199.042(1) (1987). 
38. FLA. STAT. § 199.103 (Supp. 1988). 
39. FLA. STAT. § 199.032 (1987). 
40. FLA. STAT.§§ 199.133 and 199.135 (1987). 
41. The Department of Revenue needs data on real property in Florida because the non-
recurring tax involves notes, bonds and other obligations secured by instruments like mortgages. 
See supra notes 39 and 40 and accompanying text. Hence, the Department of Revenue must be 
cognizant of real property transactions involving debt instruments in order to enforce Chapter 199. 
42. See supra notes 7 and 8 and accompanying text. 
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III. INTANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY TAX INFORMATION 
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 
The Department of Revenue depends on individual and corporate 
taxpayers to supply information concerning the ownership and control 
of intangible property interests. For the annual intangible tax, the De-
partment of Revenue requires the filing of an annual return by June 
30.43 The return requires the listing of the character, description, just 
valuation44 and location45 of all intangible personal property. However, 
the Florida Legislature deems it insufficient to rely solely on self-re-
porting by taxpayers. 46 A number of third-party reporting techniques 
have been created to aid in the collection of the intangible tax. Corpo-
rations doing business in Florida must file with the Department of 
Revenue a list of stockholders and information about the valuation of 
their stock.47 Fiduciaries must file a copy of inventories required to be 
prepared for or filed in circuit court.48 However, the two third-party 
reporting procedures that are most intrusive involve stockbrokers and 
foreign taxing authorities. The balance of this article examines both 
third party reporting procedures and the state constitutional right to 
privacy. 
A. Stockbrokers Must File Annual Reports Concerning Their Clients 
Stockbrokers registered in compliance with Florida Statutes49 must 
file with the Department of Revenue by June 30 a "position state-
ment" detailing customers' assets held by the stockbroker. 50 Such a fil-
ing is made for each customer who has a Florida mailing address,51 and 
the statement provides information about a customer's financial position 
as of December 31 of the preceding year. 52 Information about the cus-
tomer includes name, address, and social security or federal identifica-
tion number. 53 The enhanced reporting requirements involve a descrip-
tion of the assets. As of 1987, stockbrokers are required to provide more 
43. FLA. STAT. § 199.052(1) (1987). 
44. ld. 
45. FLA. ADMIN. CoDE ANN. r. 12C-2.008(1)(a) (1987). 
46. See supra notes 7 and 8 and accompanying text. 
47. FLA. STAT. §§ 199.062(1) and (2) (1987) and FLA. ADMIN. Com: ANN. r. 12C-
2.008(1)(a) (1987). 
48. FLA. STAT. § 199.062(4) (1987). 
49. FLA. STAT.§ 517.12 (1987). 
50. FLA. STAT.§ 199.062(3) (1987). However, FLA. ADMIN. Com: ANN.r. 12C-2.008(1)(b) 
provides that stockbrokers furnish the position statement by April 1. 
51. FLA. STAT.§ 199.062(3) (1987). 
52. ld. 
53. /d. 
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than just "the number and description of all securities held for the cus-
tomer."54 Stockbrokers must now provide "the number of units, value, 
and description, including the Committee on Uniform Security Identifi-
cation Procedures (CUSIP) number, if any, of all securities held for the 
customer .... "55 There is not only an increase in the amount of data to 
be reported by securities dealers but also an improvement in reporting 
technology. Brokers are required to report on magnetic media, unless 
they can demonstrate undue hardship. 56 The Department of Revenue is 
authorized to promulgate specifications and instructions for magnetic 
media reports. 57 The Department of Revenue is also authorized to re-
quire stockbrokers to include in the position statements "such other in-
formation as the department may reasonably require."58 
The brokerage reporting requirements should not be taken lightly. 
If a security broker does not file a position statement in a timely fash-
ion, the broker is subject to a $100 late filing penalty. 59 If general pen-
alty provisions of the Intangible Personal Property Tax Act are read 
broadly, brokers face even stiffer penalties for noncompliance. A bro-
ker who willfully fails to comply with the reporting provision may be 
guilty of a third degree felony,60 resulting in a prison term not exceed-
ing five years61 and a fine not exceeding $5,000.62 Also, the Depart-
ment of Revenue may examine at reasonable hours brokers' books, 
records, and documents pertinent to position statements.63 If a broker 
refuses to permit such an examination, the Department of Revenue 
may apply to a circuit court for appropriate relief.64 
The Florida Legislature and Department of Revenue have made 
stockbrokers important sources of private financial information about 
their customers. 
54. FLA. STAT. § 199.062(3) (1987). 
55. /d. 
56. /d. 
57. /d. 
58. /d. 
59. FLA. STAT. § 199.282(6)(b) (1987). 
60. FLA. STAT. § 199.282(1) (1987). The criminal penalty provisions are written particu-
larly broadly. The penalties apply to "any person," and noncompliance involves "any of the provi-
sions of this chapter." The chapter referred to is 199, the intangible tax chapter. Hence, arguably, 
the criminal penalties apply to brokers who willfully disobey. 
61. FLA. STAT. § 775.082(3)(d) (1987). 
62. FLA. STAT. § 775.083(1)(c) (1987). 
63. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 12C-2.008(5)(a) (1987). 
64. FLA. ADMIN. CoDE ANN. r. 12C-2.008(5)(c) (1987). 
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B. Authorization to Collect Information from Foreign Tax Sources 
One of the strongest information collection devices that the De-
partment of Revenue has at its disposal is the legislative authorization 
to share and collect information from government tax sources outside 
the State of Florida.611 The Department of Revenue is authorized to 
make tax information available to a variety of non-Florida government 
agencies, including the United States Treasury Department, the Inter-
nal Revenue Service, and tax collectors of other states.66 Such data may 
be provided in compliance with "any formal agreement for the mutual 
exchange of state information,"67 and may only be provided for official 
purposes.68 Hence, the Department of Revenue may exchange state col-
lected information (presumably including data concerning taxpayers of 
the intangible tax)69 for information from the Internal Revenue Service 
or non-Florida state taxing authorities to aid inter alia in the collection 
of the intangible property tax. The Department of Revenue has a 
strong arsenal of data collection devices at its disposal to collect and 
enforce the intangible personal property tax. 
Ironically, taxpayer information is protected once it is collected by 
the Department of Revenue.70 Taxpayer information may be shared by 
the Department of Revenue only under limited circumstances,71 though 
one such circumstance involves information sharing between jurisdic-
tions.72 Even when taxpayer data stored by the Department of Revenue 
are required for criminal investigation purposes, a subpoena duces te-
cum is necessary.73 Despite these limits, the Department of Revenue is 
still capable of collecting information on taxpayers from a variety of 
sources, and the privacy of individuals in Florida is compromised by 
the Department of Revenue, even though the Florida Constitution pro-
vides individuals with protection from some of the information gather-
ing techniques of the Department of Revenue. 
65. FLA. STAT. § 213.053(5) (Supp. 1988). Phone conversations with the Department of 
Revenue confirm that the Department of Revenue has an information sharing contract with the 
Internal Revenue Service. 
66. ld. The Internal Revenue Service is required to open for inspection certain federal tax 
returns. 26 U.S.C. § 6103(d) (1982). Inspection may be made by state taxing authorities for the 
purpose of administering state tax laws. !d. State officers who inspect federal tax returns must 
protect the confidentiality of any information gathered from federal returns. See 26 U.S.C. § 7213 
(1982). 
67. 26 U.S.C. § 6103(d)(1982). 
68. /d. 
69. FLA. STAT. §§ 199.222 and 213.053(6) (Supp. 1988). 
70. /d. 
71. See generally FLA. STAT. § 213.053(6) (Supp. 1988). 
72. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text. 
73. FLA. STAT. § 213.05(1) (Supp. 1988). 
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IV. THE FLORIDA CoNSTITUTION PROTECTS PRIVACY 
Information gathering by agencies of the State of Florida, includ-
ing the Department of Revenue, must be carefully scrutinized because 
the Florida Constitution in Article I, Section 23 provides: "Every natu-
ral person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental 
intrusion into his private life except as otherwise provided herein. This 
section shall not be construed to limit the public's right of access to 
public records and meetings as provided by law."74 
Art. I, § 23 was passed by a vote of the people of Florida on 
November 4, 1980,75 having been placed on the ballot by the Florida 
Legislature.76 The provision became effective in January 1981.77 A 
provision with almost the same wording was one part of a major over-
haul of the Florida Constitution78 that was defeated in November 
1978.79 The differences between the version defeated in 1978 and the 
version passed. in 1980 are minimal.80 The fact of the similarity be-
tween the two versions is important to an interpretation of the 1980 
version. Either the drafters of the 1978 version are also the drafters of 
the 1980 provision that is now law81 or the drafters of the 1980 version 
share the same motivations and intentions as the drafters of the 1978 
version. 82 That the intentions of the authors of the 1978 and 1980 ver-
sions are the same is important to an interpretation because there is 
74. FLA. CoNST. art. I, § 23 is part of the Declaration of Rights and is entitled "Right of 
Privacy." 
75. Cope, A Quick Look at Florida's New Right of Privacy, 55 FLORIDA B.J. 12, 12 (1981). 
76. FLA. CoNST. art. XI, § I provides that constitutional revisions "may be proposed by joint 
resolution agreed to by three-fifths of the membership of each house of the legislature." For legis-
lative action on Art. I, § 23. See 1980 FLA. LAWS HousE joiNT RESOLUTION 387. 
77. See FLA. CoNST. art. XI, § S(c). 
78. See appendix, Revised Constitution of the State of Florida as Proposed by the Constitu-
tion Revision Commission, Appendix, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 1173, 1176 (1978). 
79. Cope, A Quick Look at Florida's New Right of Privacy, supra note 75, at 12. 
80. The wording of the first sentence which constitutes the substance of the provision is the 
same in both versions. The 1980 version added a second sentence preserving certai'l public records 
and open meetings statutes. 
81. See Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987). Justice 
Rosemary Barkett discusses the concerns of the drafters of the 1980 provision. Barkett's discussion 
can be read as identifying the 1980 drafters as the same as the 1978 drafters because the Justice 
reviews the proceedings of the 1977-78 Constitutional Revision Commission. According to this 
view, the 1980 Legislature simply placed the 1978 version on the ballot with an additional sen-
tence. /d. at 536. 
82. See South Florida Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d at 536. Justice Barkett refers to the 
proceedings of the 1977-78 Constitution Revision Commission as revealing the concerns of the 
drafters of art. I, § 23. According to this view, the 1980 Legislature accepted the 1978 version, 
and the 1980 Legislature can be seen as the drafter of the provision. Hence, even though the 
Legislature can be viewed as the independent drafter who just depended on the work of others, 
Justice Barkett envisions the Legislature as responding to and incorporating the concerns and 
intent of those who drafted the original version that was defeated in 1978. 
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good source material from the drafting of the 1978 verswn that aids in 
understanding the 1980 provision.83 
A. The Right of Privacy is a Limited Right 
Florida's constitutional right of privacy provides narrow protec-
tions.84 Art. I, § 23 protects only natural persons, and, therefore, does 
not protect corporations or associations. 811 It is not clear whether a part-
nership or joint venture is protected. 86 What is clear is that security 
brokers87 as corporate entities68 are not protected by Art. I, § 23 from 
83. Two such sources have proved invaluable. Both are written by the same author, who 
worked with the 1977-78 Constitution Revision Commission. These are: Notes, Toward A Right 
of Privacy as A Matter State Constitutional Law, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 633 (1977) and Cope, To 
Be Let Alone: Florida's Proposed Right of Privacy, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 673 (1978). The later 
article is particularly helpful in interpreting Art. I, § 23, and this author depends on Cope's 
fundamental analyses throughout this article. However, the author disagrees with Cope on a num-
ber of crucial points, and one such point provides a basic disagreement critical to this article. Cope 
argues that the 1978 version of the right of privacy should have little or no impact on the State of 
Florida's taxing power: 
One critic of the right of privacy suggested that it could undermine the ability of the 
state to govern through the police power and the taxing power. There is no basis at all 
for this concern since the taxing power of the State exists through express constitutional 
provision which would not be undercut by a coequal right of privacy. 
Cope, To Be Let Alone:, supra note 85, at 770. Cope does not support his assertion, which is 
inconsistent with the basic thesis of his article. Cope proposes that the Florida courts adopt a 
compelling state interest standard in interpreting the right of privacy provision in order to prevent 
constitutional grants of power to state entities from negating the right to privacy. See id. at 749. 
Why the power to tax is more important than another state power is unclear. This author finds 
nothing to support Cope's assertion and wonders whether Cope was attempting to calm opponents 
of the 1978 proposal. Cope reveals his own ideological commitment to the adoption in Florida of a 
constitutionally protected right of privacy in the biographical footnote, To Be Let Alone:, supra 
note 83, when Cope states: "The author testified before the 1978 Constitution Revision Commis-
sion, urging it to place a freestanding right of privacy in the revision proposal." 
84. For excellent overviews of Art. I, § 23 as a newly enacted provision, See Cope, To Be Let 
Alone:, supra note 83 and Note, Interpreting Florida's New Constitutional Right of Privacy, 33 
U. FLA. L. REV. 565 (1981). Both articles provide suggestions to the Florida courts on how to 
interpret the new privacy right. 
85. See Interpreting Florida's New Constitutional Right of Privacy, supra note 84, at 572. 
86. See Cope, To Be Let Alone:, supra note 83, at n.411, where Prof. Kurland is quoted as 
writing, "When the affairs regulated are not those of individuals but those of groups, the concern 
is not privacy." Kurland, The Private I, U. CHI. MAGAZINE, Autumn 1976, at 34. 
By quoting Kurland, Cope is arguing that the right of privacy is restricted or non-existent 
when applied to economic organizations. Kurland seems to be applying his thesis to "corporations, 
classes, organizations, and associations." /d. 
It is not clear that Kurland applies his thesis to partnerships and joint ventures, which are 
much more personal than corporations or associations. Partnership and joint venture privacy inter-
ests would seem to be a sum of all the privacy interests of the individuals involved, while the 
privacy interests of corporations or associations would seem to relate to an entity separate from the 
corporation's owners or workers. 
87. FLA. STAT. § 517.021 (1987). 
88. FLA. STAT. §§ 517.021(9)(a)(1) and 517.021(16) (1987). Under the Florida Securities 
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disclosing a customer position statement to the Department of Reve-
nue.89 Security brokers as individuals90 are protected by the constitu-
tional right of privacy, but it is doubtful whether they have a protected 
privacy interest in their customers' position statements, although indi-
vidual and corporate brokers may have standing to protect their cus-
tomers' individual rights of privacy.91 In any event, it is clear that Art. 
I, § 23 applies to individual customers of brokers. Individual people 
have a right to be let alone, which means a right to privacy.92 What 
constitutes privacy is not apparent in the words of the constitutional 
provision, but there is a reference to "private life." Though there is no 
easy definition of "private life," this indefinite concept rests on an indi-
vidual's expectation of privacy93 or intention to keep information pri-
vate.94 An expectation of privacy is divorced from whether a physical 
setting is considered a private one,911 and depends on whether the over-
all circumstances allow the individual to reasonably foresee, predict, or 
believe that private circumstances exist.96 The test is at least partially a 
subjective one as the limits of individual privacy can be determined only 
and Investor Protection Act, a dealer may be a natural person, corporation, partnership, associa-
tion joint-stock company, or unincorporated organization. 
89. FLA. STAT. § 199.062(3) (1987). 
90. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
91. See City of Daytona Beach v. Del Percio, 476 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 1985). The Del Percio 
Court holds that the owner of a bar does not have standing to assert on behalf of bar patrons that 
a city ordinance violates the First Amendment, because the patron behavior that the bar owner 
seeks to protect from prosecution is not protected by the First Amendment over-breadth cases. 476 
So. 2d at 202-3. Del Percio does not apply to an Art. I, § 23 case, because the individual broker-
age customer is protected by Art. I, § 23. Florida Medical Association v. Dep't of Professional 
Regulation, 426 So. 2d 1112,1114 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), holds that an optometrist's patient 
does not have standing to challenge a regulation permitting optometrists to issue prescriptions 
because the patient could avoid optometrists and patronize opthamologists. 426 So. 2d at 1114 n.4. 
Hence, the patient was not injured by the new regulation, because he could choose to obtain eye 
care from another source that also had the authority to issue prescriptions. Florida Medical Asso-
ciation does not apply to stock brokers challenging Art. I, § 23 on behalf of customers because the 
brokers will be out of business without customers. The relation is very different from that of 
patient-optometrist. There is no way for a brokerage customer to avoid the intangible property tax 
or obtain brokerage services from alternate sources. Hence, unlike in Florida Medical Association 
a broker's challenge to Art. I, § 23 would not be "speculative, nonspecific, and hypothetical." ld. 
92. See, e.g., Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners Re: Applicant, 443 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1983}, where 
C. J. Alderman, for the Court, discusses the interest protected by Art. I, § 23 as the "constitu-
tional right of privacy." 
93. See State v. Calhoun, 479 So. 2d 241 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985), where the Court at-
tempts to define whether an individual has a right to privacy while he discusses criminal activity 
with a family member in an interrogation room being monitored and videotaped by law enforce-
ment officers. The individual had asserted his Miranda rights. J. Barkett, for the Court, bases her 
analysis on both Art. I, §§ 12 and 23. Art. I, § 12 protections against unreasonable searches and 
seizures. 
94. Shaktman v. State of Florida, 14 FLA. L. WEEKLY 522, 523 (Fla. 1989). 
95. 479 So. 2d at 244. 
96. Id. 
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by the individual. The Florida courts appear to be combining subjective 
and objective tests by focusing on individual intentions and whether "in 
most instances the individual has no intention of communicating to a 
third party."97 
The Florida Constitution does not protect against every violation 
of privacy, but only those that are governmental intrusions.98 More-
over, there must be governmental action. 99 What constitutes a govern-
mental intrusion is another question. A request to an individual by a 
state agency or court for health data is considered at least "a limited 
intrusion."100 The Department of Revenue's requirement that securi-
ties brokers provide financial data on individual customers constitutes 
at least a minimal intrusion into the private lives of individual 
customers. 101 
The constitutional right to privacy is limited by other provisions of 
the Florida Constitution because Art. I, § 23 includes the limitation 
"except as otherwise provided herein." This exception could be read as 
swallowing up or completely negating the privacy right. All grants of 
power in the Florida Constitution to Florida government could be 
viewed as providing agencies the authority to gain whatever data are 
needed to fulfill their missions. 102 In other words, a general grant of 
authority could imply that an agency has the power to collect appropri-
ate data to aid that agen~y in meeting its duties. Therefore, a general 
constitutional grant of authority to collect necessary data is implied. 
There are two problems with this view. First, such a view negates the 
intent of the drafters of the privacy provision because "there can be no 
doubt that the Florida amendment was intended to protect the right to 
determine whether or not sensitive information about oneself will be 
disclosed to others."103 The provision is intended "to afford individuals 
some protection against the increasing collection, retention, and use of 
information relating to all facets of an individual's life. " 104 The restric-
97. Shaktman, supra note 94. 
98. Cope, To Be Let Alone: Florida's Proposed Right of Privacy, supra note 83, at 742. 
99. See Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners Re: Applicant, 443 So. 2d 71, 74 (Fla. 1983). 
100. ld. 
101. See infra notes 162-227 and accompanying text. 
102. Cope expresses this concern when he writes: 
The privacy section ends with the phrase 'except as otherwise provide herein.' This 
phrase could be taken to have another meaning, apart from its intended purpose of 
sustaining open government. The phrase could be read to indicate that the right to be 
let alone is absolute - except when governmental action is authorized by some other 
constitutional section. Under this approach, one seeks to justify governmental activity 
by ransacking the constitution for the controlling section. 
Cope, To Be Let Alone: Florida's Proposed Right of Privacy, supra note 83, at 749. 
103. Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 536 (Fla. 1987). 
104. Id. 
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tion of the privacy right to only those areas of government to which the 
Florida Constitution does not make an explicit grant of governmental 
authority means that the drafters proposed a weak and meaningless 
constitutional protection. 
Second, such a view undermines the privacy right as a "fundamen-
tal right," 1011 relegating it to no more than a personal right to be bal-
anced against equally weighted governmental authority.106 An individ-
ual right that is easily outweighed by a general grant of governmental 
authority is not much of a right and certainly not a fundamental right. 
The drafters of the privacy provision rejected such an equal weighing 
when they "rejected the use of the words 'unreasonable' or 'unwar-
ranted' before the phrase governmental intrusion."107 In fact, this right 
of privacy is intended to be a right which is "as strong as possible. " 108 
The words "except as otherwise provided herein" must mean 
something. They were added for a reason. If these words do not refer to 
general constitutional grants of authority / 09 then they refer to constitu-
tional provisions that specifically require that individual data or infor-
mation be reported to the State of Florida or be made public. 110 If Art. 
I, § 23 does not provide for such an exception, any constitutional provi-
sion in existence in 1980 which specifically provides for data collection 
implicitly is repealed or at least curtailed by the new right of privacy. 
Such a result undercuts guarantees of responsive and responsible gov-
ernment such as financial disclosures required of public officers and 
candidates, m disclosure of campaign financing/ 12 publication of legis-
lative journals, 113 reports of judicial discipline, 114 and information 
about judicial appointments.m When the privacy provision originally 
was proposed in 1978, the language "except as otherwise provided 
herein" was "inserted to make clear that the right of privacy does not 
undercut the constitutional provisions relating to financial disclosure, 
public records, and open meetings."116 However, the public records and 
open meetings provisions were defeated in 1978 along with all the pro-
105. Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1985). See In 
Re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1191-92 (Fla. 1989). 
106. See Cope, To Be Let Alone: Florida's Right of Privacy, supra note 83, at 749-50. 
107. Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 548 (Fla. 1985). 
108. !d. 
109. See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text. 
II 0. A number of such sections exist. See notes infra 111-15 and accompanying text. 
Ill. FLA. CoNST. art. II, § 8(a) (1987). 
112. FLA. CoNST. art. II, § 8(b) (1987). 
113. FLA. CoNST. art. III, § 4(c) (1987). 
114. FLA. CoNST. art. V, § 12(d) (1987). 
115. FLA. CoNST. art. V, § ll(d) (1987). 
116. Cope, To Be Let Alone: Florida's Proposed Right of Privacy, supra note 83, at 743. 
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posed amendments to the Florida Constitution.117 
The Florida Constitution does not include a specific requirement 
or grant of authority to the Department of Revenue to force individuals 
or brokers serving individuals to report financial data on a blanket or 
automatic basis to the State of Florida.118 The tax provisions of the 
Constitution do not read like a grant of power to tax, 119 but read like 
limitations on the power of the State and its local governments to 
tax.120 Implicitly, only the State is provided the exclusive authority to 
raise an int&ngible personal property tax, 121 though the State of Florida 
has inherent sovereign power to tax122 "subject only to controlling con-
stitutional limitations."123 This inherent taxing power is legislative 
power.124 The Constitution specifically grants the Florida Legislature 
its power to legislate. 1211 That broad grant of legislative power cannot 
be what Art. I, § 23 is referring to "as otherwise provided herein." If 
Art. I, § 23 refers to such a broad grant of power, the Legislature can 
override the constitutional right of privacy simply by legislating. The 
right of privacy no longer would be "fundamental" but would be de-
fined solely by the Legislature. At the same time, the constitutional 
limitations on taxing authority cannot serve as grants of authority re-
ferred to as "otherwise provided herein," because such a reading is il-
logical. A limitation on authority runs counter to a grant of authority, 
and a limitation of the authority of the sovereign can not be read as 
weakening a fundamental right such as the right of privacy. 
B. The Right of Privacy is Applied to Limited Circumstances 
The Florida courts apply or refuse to apply the state constitutional 
rigbt to privacy in two contexts: public disclosure of personal matters 
and personal decision-making. 126 The personal decision category in-
volves two distinct types of cases. First, soon after the constitutional 
117. Art. I, § 23 includes a final sentence providing, "[t]his section shall not be construed to 
limit the public's right of access to public records and meetings as provided by law." Hence, the 
right of privacy does not restrict open government statutes such as FLA. STAT. Ch. 119. 
118. See FLA. CoNST. art. VII (1987) which authorizes finance and taxation for the state 
and local governments in Florida. 
119. FLA. CoNST. art. VII,§ !(a) (1985). 
120. !d. Art. VII begins, "[n]o tax shall be levied except in pursuance of law." 
121. /d. 
122. Department of Revenue v. Markham, 381 So. 2d 1101, 1110 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1979). See also Belcher Oil Co. v. Dade County, 271 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 1972). 
123. 381 So. 2d at 1110. 
124. /d. 
125. FLA. CoNST. art. III, § I (1987) provides: "[t]he legislative power of the state shall be 
vested in a legislature of the State of Florida .... " 
126. In Re T.W., 14 FLA. LAW WEEKLY 531, 532 (Fla. 1989). 
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amendment became effective, 127 criminal defendants asserted that activ-
ities which could be characterized as victimless crimes such as drug 
possession or trafficking were protected from state interference, specifi-
cally criminal prosecution. 128 Florida declined to recognize such a pri-
vacy protection unlike at least one other state with a state constitutional 
right of privacy.129 The Florida courts dismissed the criminal appel-
lants privacy arguments without explanation although in one case stat-
ing, "no compelling argument has been made in support .... "130 Sec-
ond, actions involving personal health are protected by Art. I, § 23. 
These actions involve decision-making about refusaP31 or discontinua-
tion of medical procedures. 132 The Florida courts are especially protec-
tive of the right of individuals to refuse medical treatment or order 
treatment discontinued even to the point of holding "that right extends 
to incompetent persons who are unable to exercise the right in their 
own behalf."133 Hence, a person has the right to order the discontinua-
tion of the nasogastric feeding of his or her terminally ill spouse/34 and 
a woman has the right to abort a fetus. 1311 
The public disclosure of personal matters category includes three 
types of information or data. First, personal knowledge about or obser-
vations of criminal activity are not protected by Art. I, § 23 from inves-
tigation or interrogation by state investigative officers. 136 Second, per-
sonal information concerning health or emotional problems is protected 
from disclosure/ 37 though an individual waives that protection when he 
or she seeks an office of public trust. 138 Last, data related to personal 
finances138 and day-to-day transactions140 are protected, though there 
are circumstances that require that such data be disclosed to state inves-
127. Two cases involving controlled substances reached the appellate stage in 1982. 
128. See Maisler v. State, 425 So. 2d 107 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) petition for rev. den. 
434 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 1983); State v. Ralston, 422 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). 
129. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975). 
130. Maisler v. State, 425 So. 2d at 108. 
131. See Wons v. The Public Health Trust of Dade, 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989); St. Mary's 
Hospital v. Ramsey, 465 So. 2d 666 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). 
132. See In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), Corbett v. 
D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986), rev. denied 492 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 
1986). 
133. 487 So. 2d at 370. 
134. Id. 
135. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989). 
136. In re Getty, 427 So. 2d 380 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). 
137. See South Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987). 
138. See Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners Re: Applicant, 443 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1983). 
139. See Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1985). 
140. See Shaktman v. State of Florida, 14 FLA. LAw WEEKLY 522 (Fla. 1989). 
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tigators.141 Overall, the public disclosure category applies to personal 
information that people normally and understandably want to keep pri-
vate. Disclosure of such information could create professional or em-
ployment problems/42 impact an individual's private property inter-
ests/43 or open a person's private habits to public review. a• 
The public disclosure category cases have created conceptual 
problems for the Florida courts.1411 The courts have been forced to focus 
to some extent on the location where the communication occurs. Com-
munication that occurs in a location that is considered public, such as a 
store, is not protected from surveillance.146 However, under certain cir-
cumstances, a conversation between relatives that occurs in an interro-
gation room is protected. a 7 In these cases individual expectations about 
privacy are especially critical.148 
C. The Reluctance to Define a Standard of Review 
For almost five years the Florida courts refused to determine what 
standard of review to apply to the new constitutional right of privacy. 
The standard of review was among the first issues debated by the draft-
ers of the original 1978 version.149 There was fear that the Florida 
courts might dilute the right of privacy by "deciding cases on their par-
ticular facts or in an unarticulated process of balancing."1110 Some pri-
vacy provision supporters even believed that a compelling interest test 
was too weak. 1111 Other states that have adopted a state constitutional 
right of privacy have used either a compelling state interest testl 112 or a 
weaker means-ends test. 1113 
141. Winfield, 477 So. 2d 544. 
142. See Bar Examiners, 443 So. 2d 71, where an applicant to the Florida Bar refused to 
answer questions about health and emotional problems. The Florida Bar, in turn, refused to pro-
cess the applicant's application creating a delay for the applicant in obtaining employment as a 
licensed attorney. 
143. See Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 545, where a state regulatory agency questioned the owner-
ship of racehorses. 
144. See Shaktman, 14 FLA. L. WEEKLY at 522, where criminal investigators utilized a pen 
register at a residence. 
145. See Adams v. State, 436 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). 
146. /d. at 1133. 
147. See State v. Calhoun, 479 So. 2d 241 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). 
148. !d. at 244. See Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 548 
(Fla. 1985). 
149. See Cope, To Be Let Alone: Florida's Proposed Right of Privacy, supra note 83, at 
724. 
150. /d. at 725. 
151. !d. 
152. Id. at 745. Montana includes a compelling interest standard in the words of the privacy 
provision. MoNT. CoNST. Art. II, § 10. 
153. /d. at 746. Alaska has opted for the means-ends test. See Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 
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After Florida enacted Art. I, § 23, the Florida courts used a vari-
ety of means to avoid developing a standard of review. One court found 
in the context of marijuana possession that an individual asserting his 
or her privacy right has to make a compelling argument in support of 
that right being applied. 1114 Other courts dismissed the assertion of a 
privacy right either by finding no reasonable expectation of privacy 
under the circumstances11111 or by interpreting the intent of the Florida 
voters when they passed the right of privacy provision.1118 Even when 
posed with an opportunity to decide what standard to apply, the Flor-
ida Supreme Court declined to do so by finding "[ w )e need not make 
that decision ... since ... we find that the Board's action meets even 
the highest standard of the compelling state interest test." 1117 
Finally, at the end of 1985, the Florida Supreme Court applied a 
compelling state interest test, 1118 finding that "[ t )his test shifts the bur-
den of proof to the state to justify an intrusion on privacy."1119 How-
ever, even a year after deciding to apply a strict scrutiny standard, the 
Florida Supreme Court remained diffident in applying the test/80 
though the court reaffirmed that the compelling state interest standard 
is appropriate for " ... a review of state action that infringes privacy 
rights under Article I, § 23."181 
V. THE TAX REPORTING AND DATA COLLECTION PROVISIONS 
ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
The stockbroker reporting182 and the foreign taxing authority in-
formation sharing provisions188 are unconstitutional as violations of the 
(Alaska. 1975). 
154. Maisler v. State, 425 So. 2d 107, 108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). 
155. Adams v. State, 436 So. 2d 1132, 1133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). 
156. In re Getty, 427 So. 2d 380, 383 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). 
157. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners Re: Applicant, 443 So. 2d 71, 74 (Fla. 1983). 
158. Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 548 (Fla. 1985). 
159. /d. at 547. 
160. See Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood Serv. Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 535 (Fla 1987), 
where the court finds that a court "need not engage in the stricter scrutiny mandated by constitu-
tional analysis. We find that the interests involved here adequately protected under our discovery 
rules .... " The court's desire not to reach a constitutional issue where there are grounds for a 
decision based on rules is respectable. However, it is peculiar that the Court then incorporates 
very weighty federal and state constitutional policy considerations in its analysis. In fact, Rasmus-
sen is one of the best discussions of Art. I, § 23. The court easily could have decided Rasmussen 
on state constitutional privacy right grounds, but for some reason masked its constitutional decision 
by a procedural decision. 
161. Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d at 535. 
162. FLA. STAT. § 199.062(3) (1987). See supra notes 49-64 and accompanying text. 
163. FLA. STAT. § 213.053(5) (Supp. 1988). See supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text. 
An argument could be made that Art. I, § 23 does not apply to any information gathered from the 
Internal Revenue Service because Congress authorized such information gathering by state govern-
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Florida State constitutional right of privacy.164 The second category of 
state constitutional privacy cases1611 decided by the Florida courts, the 
public disclosure of private information cases/66 applies most directly 
to the tax reporting and foreign data sharing provisions. The Florida 
courts hold that the state has to make a strong showing to justify re-
quiring an individual to provide information to a state agency. 
In Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering167 the Florida 
Supreme Court found that the state constitutional privacy provision 
"recognizes an individual's legitimate expectation of privacy in finan-
cial institution records.m68 Winfield involved an investigation by the 
Florida Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering which believed that a "pri-
vate citizen did not actually own the racehorses as he had reported and 
that his ownership was really a front for other members of his family 
and/or closely held family corporations.m69 The Division of Pari-
Mutuel Wagering, as part of its investigation, subpoenaed the individ-
ual's bank records without providing notice to the individual. 170 
First, it is remarkable that the supreme court characterizes the 
privacy expectations as extending to "financial institution records." The 
court characterizes the bank records this way at least twice/71 and opts 
not to view Winfield in narrow terms as applying only to bank records. 
The court could view Winfield narrowly because the Winfield privacy 
analysis begins with United States v. Miller, 172 a bank record subpoena 
case. The court also discusses the inapplicability of another bank record 
case, Meholnick v. First National Bank. 173 The court could easily fo-
cus only on the bank record aspect of the case and how Meholnick and 
Miller does or does not apply to the Winfield circumstances. Instead, 
ments by enacting 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (1982). The supremacy clause, Article VI of the United 
States Constitution, would require that effect be given to the mandate that the I.R.S. share infor-
mation with the states. Such an argument fails because the words of 26 U.S.C. 6103 limit the state 
authority to inspect to the extent that state law allows such inspections. "Returns ... shall be 
open to inspection by, or disclosure to, any state agency ... which is charged under the laws of 
such State with the responsibility for the administration of State tax laws for the purpose of ... 
the administration of such laws ... " 26 U.S.C. § 6103(d) (1982). The Florida Department of 
Revenue is charged with the collection of taxes. See FLA. STAT.§ 20.21, (1985). But that charge 
or authorization is limited by the Florida Constitution, See, e.g, FLA. CoNST. art. VII. 
164. FLA. CoNST. art. I, § 23, See supra notes 74-159 and accompanying text. 
165. See supra notes 136-148 and accompanying text. 
166. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
167. 477 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1985). 
168. !d. at 548. 
169. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering v. Winfield, 443 So. 2d 455, 456 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1984). 
170. !d. 
171. 477 So. 2d at 547, 548. 
172. 425 U.S. 435 (1976) discussed in Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 547. 
173. 224 So. 2d 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) discussed in Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 546-47. 
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the court paints a broader picture, applying broad historical privacy 
considerations174 along with Art. I, § 23 to a wide class of financial 
records. Winfield is applicable to stock brokerage records, as brokerage 
houses are financial institutions or, at least, act in that capacity. 1711 
Second, the Winfield court requires that the Division of Pari-
Mutuel Wagering bear the burden of proof to "justify an intrusion of 
privacy" under the compelling state interest standard. 176 The Division 
of Pari-Mutuel Wagering succeeded at bearing that burden by showing 
that the state has a compelling interest in conducting effective investiga-
tions in the pari-mutuel industry.177 The court characterizes the work 
of the Pari-Mutuel Wagering agency as "regulation."178 Though the 
court does not focus on the general circumstances of the case in its anal-
ysis, it does mention that the trial court found that there was probable 
cause to institute the investigation.179 The court also discusses the exis-
tence of the subpoena. 180 The Winfield court finds that the privacy pro-
vision does not apply where a state agency is carrying out a regulatory 
function, the agency has probable cause to believe that an individual 
who falls under the agency's regulatory powers has violated statutes 
and regulations, and the agency uses a subpoena. As to financial 
records protected by the privacy provision, the Winfield court holds 
broadly, but as to what state actions are permissible under the privacy 
provision, the Winfield court holds narrowly. 
In Florida Board of Bar Examiners Re: Applicant, 181 the su-
preme court found that the right of privacy protects information about 
"private life."182 In Bar Examiners, an applicant to the Florida Bar 
refused to answer a question relating to treatment for mental health 
174. The court starts its overall analysis in Winfield with a quote from Justice Brandeis' 
dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). The court then reviews the federal 
privacy cases such as Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 118 (1973) concluding that the federal cases are not 
applicable to Winfield and that " ... [i]n formulating privacy interests, the Supreme Court has 
given much of the responsibility to the individual states." 477 So. 2d at 547. 
175. See, e.g., Rudd v. State, 386 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) where the Court 
distinguishes between a loan and a security. In distinguishing the two transactions, the Court 
concedes "[T]he term 'loan' and 'investment' are often used when referring to the same type of 
transaction." /d. at 1219. Rudd revolves around defining differences between similar financial 
activities. The court is posed with actions that could be viewed either as a loan, an activity primar-
ily carried out by banks or individuals, or as a sale of a security, an activity primarily carried out 
by a stock dealer. 
176. 477 So. 2d at 547. 
177. /d. at 548. 
178. /d. at 547. 
179. Id. at 546. 
180. /d. at 546, 548. 
181. 443 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1983). 
182. /d. 
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problems in the Bar Examiner's application. 183 The court found that 
the Bar Examiner's request for information met "the highest standard 
of the compelling state interest test,"184 though the court declined in the 
1983 case to state whether the strict scrutiny standard is applicable to 
Art. I, § 23.m The Bar Examiners fulfilled their heavy burden under 
strict scrutiny by showing "an important societal need."186 In this case 
the societal need involves ensuring the fitness of those who apply to 
practice law. 187 Further, the Bar Examiners, as a state agency/88 pro-
tect the public by assuring that those whom the Bar Examiners allow 
to assume positions of public trust and responsibility are capable of 
coping with the mental and emotional pressures inherent in legal prac-
tice.189 To fulfill their obligation to the public, the Bar Examiners re-
quire a wide range of candidate data.190 The court found that personal 
information about mental health is not protected by the state constitu-
tional right to privacy in the general context where "the state has a 
compelling state interest in regulating the legal profession .... " 191 The 
court also recognized that a candidate to the Bar volunteers to apply for 
a privilege from the State;192 therefore, the candidate holds himself or 
herself open to intimate, though focused, inquiry. 193 
Bar Examiners is decided similarly to Winfield. First, the court 
applies the protection of the right of privacy to a wide category activity, 
"private life," avoiding a narrow view of the case as impacting only 
psychological or health information. Second, the court requires that a 
state agency have a specialized, regulatory reason for requiring the dis-
closure of information. However, the court in Bar Examiners focuses 
on societal needs and impacts in assessing whether a compelling state 
purpose exists. The court does not use such an analysis in Winfield, 
possibly because the societal needs are implied in the nature of the 
pari-mutuel statutory and regulatory scheme that requires "effective 
investigations. " 194 
183. /d. at 72-3. 
184. Id. at 74. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. 
187. ld. at 75. 
188. /d. at 74. 
189. /d. at 75. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. The Court discusses how the United States Supreme Court in Goldfarb v. Virginia 
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) recognizes the states' compelling interest in regulating the Bar. 
192. 443 So. 2d 71, 74 (Fla. 1983). 
193. Id. 
194. 477 So. 2d at 548. 
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Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc., 1911 decided in 
1987, adds a new element to the state constitutional right of privacy 
analysis. In Rasmussen, the court reviewed the impact of disclosure of 
personal information on an individual's life.196 This is unlike Winfield 
and Bar Examiners where the court focuses on the state's justifications 
for requiring the disclosure of data. In Rasmussen, a victim contracted 
AIDS from blood transfusions required as a result of an automobile 
accident. While suing the driver of the automobile that injured him, 
Rasmussen sought blood donor records from a local blood bank.197 The 
court found through its analyses of the privacy interests involved that 
"[d]isclosure of donor identities in any context involving AIDS could be 
extremely disruptive and even devastating to the individual donor."198 
By reviewing the impact of disclosure on the individual, the court 
is not receding from the requirements of Winfield and Bar Examiners 
that the State carry the burden of justifying the need for disclosure. 
The court states, "[t]his opinion in no way changes or dilutes the com-
pelling state interest standard appropriate to a review of state ac-
tion .... »~99 The court does not use a compelling state interest stan-
dard because "the interests involved here are adequately protected 
under our discovery rules. . . . "200 
It would be easy to dismiss Rasmussen as a discovery rule case not 
relevant to a constitutional right of privacy analysis. However, the su-
preme court places great emphasis on Art. I, § 23 in deciding Rasmus-
sen, 201 and extensively reviews the history and policy underlying the 
constitutional right to privacy.202 The impact of disclosure on an indi-
vidual's life appears to be the crux of the court's privacy interest analy-
sis. Though the court reviews the impact of the discovery rules on the 
case, that review focuses narrowly in breadth on the discovery request 
in Rasmussen. 203 The court finds "the subpoena in question gives peti-
tioner access to the names and addresses of the blood donors with no 
restrictions on their use."204 The impact of disclosure involves the risk 
that friends and employers may learn about the information,2011 and the 
court does not limit its sensitivity to the impact of disclosure to the 
195. 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987). 
196. !d. at 537. 
197. !d. at 534. 
198. !d. at 537. 
199. !d. at 535. 
200. !d. 
201. !d. at 536-37. 
202. !d. 
203. !d. at 537. 
204. !d. 
205. !d. 
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context of AIDS. "[T]he importance of protecting the privacy of donor 
information does not depend on the stigma associated with 
AIDS .... "206 
Shaktman v. State of Florida207 is a criminal case involving book-
making, conspiracy, and racketeering. Police used a pen register after 
court approval to record phone numbers at the home of a suspect.206 
The Florida Supreme Court in Shaktman clarified the underlying phi-
losophy of Art. I, § 23. A goal of the privacy provision is to encourage 
independence and individualism by creating a zone of privacy into 
which government may not enter without consent. What is assured is 
the inviolability of thought, action, and the person. The right to privacy 
protected by Art. I, § 23 is so strong that its inviolability is preeminent 
"over 'majoritarian sentiment' and thus can not be universally defined 
by consensus."209 Personal intention and expectation are essential to 
defining what is included in the zone of privacy because the limits of an 
individual's privacy is dictateq both by the individual and what is rea-
sonable.210 As a result, pen register data are still protected even though 
the telephone company maintains similar records. What is critical is the 
expectation that the government will receive the information and not 
just that other people or a corporation in the course of its business will 
receive the information. 
The Shaktman court found that Art. I, § 23 protects telephonic 
communications made from a residence.211 At the same time, the court 
failed to apply the protections of Art. I, § 23 to the criminal defendants 
in Shaktman. The court found that a compelling state interest existed 
where the state demonstrates a clear connection between illegal activity 
and a person whose privacy is being invaded. A legitimate, ongoing 
criminal investigation creates a compelling state interest so long as a 
reasonable founded suspicion that the communication or private infor-
mation is being used for a criminal purpose exists.212 Also, the state 
must use the least intrusive method to obtain the information,213 and 
must observe procedural safeguards such as judicial approval prior to 
an intrusion into a person's privacy.214 
The public disclosure of personal information category of privacy 
206. !d. 
207. 14 FLA. L. WEEKLY 522 (Fla. 1989). 
208. Id. at 522. 
209. !d. at 523. 
210. !d. 
211. /d. 
212. /d. 
213. /d. at 524. 
214. /d. 
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right cases limits the privacy right protection where a state agency 
needs to investigate the activities of individuals. However, this need to 
investigate overcomes the privacy right only in prescribed circum-
stances. First, the agency must be involved in critical regulatory func-
tions that safeguard the public from harm. The Bar Examiners assure 
that prospective attorneys will not injure the public interest, while the 
Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering guards against abuses in an indus-
try that involves not only sport but also gambling and animals. Dishon-
est attorneys could injure individual lives and property while dishonest 
racehorse owners could foster cheating, corruption and cruelty to 
animals. 
Second, the need to investigate is based on statutory or regulatory 
provisions aimed at regulating specific behavior such as lawyer conduct, 
horse racing, and criminal activity. In order for a state agency to collect 
data, there must be either a violation of a statute or regulation or an 
individual applying for or receiving a privilege under a statute or regu-
lation that protects the public trust and confidence. In fact, the public 
disclosure cases involve either criminal conduct or voluntary acquies-
cence to state regulation as in horse racing and the practice of law. In a 
sense, a criminal violation is a voluntary acquiescence to state regula-
tion because those who commit crimes take the risk that they will be 
prosecuted by a state agency. The public disclosure cases also involve 
the existence of reasonable founded suspicion and at least two cases 
involve subpoenae. 2111 
The right of privacy is not limited by the Department of Reve-
nue's general need for information about a taxpayer because the De-
partment's data collection needs do not fit within the exception to the 
right of privacy protection carved by the public disclosure cases. The 
Department of Revenue is involved in tax collection,216 and that is not 
a critical regulatory function safeguarding the public from harm. There 
is no industry oversight involved in tax collection functions. Taxpayers 
cannot be likened to racehorse owners or candidates to the Bar. Though 
taxpayers may have a generalized duty to pay the intangible property 
tax,217 such a duty does not involve the same public trust and confi-
dence expected of an attorney. The taxpayer is closer to "the tradesman 
and businessmen"218 against whom attorneys are contrasted by the Bar 
Examiners court. 
215. In re Getty, 427 So. 2d 380, 380 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Winfield v. Division of 
Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 546 (Fla. 1985). 
216. FLA. STAT.§ 20.21 (1987). 
217. See FLA. STAT. § 199.052 (1987). 
218. 443 So. 2d at 75. 
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An argument can be made that taxpaying is a regulated activity to 
which all people who own intangible property voluntarily submit and 
which involves tax evasion. It can be argued that the Department of 
Revenue has a compelling need to catch evaders, and that all intangible 
property owners must submit themselves to scrutiny to assure that they 
are not evaders. But such an argument undercuts the whole idea of the 
state constitutional right of privacy as a basic right.219 All the state 
must show, under that argument, is that tax collection is a compelling 
state purpose. However, such a showing means that any important 
state function is a compelling state purpose that can overcome the right 
of privacy, and the fears of the framers of the privacy provision con-
cerning a watered down standard of review are realized. 220 This basic 
right is transformed into an individual interest that can be outweighed 
easily by a countervailing state interest.221 Taxpaying is not an indus-
try like horse racing or the practice of law. That taxpaying is regulated 
by a set of laws and rules does not convert the activity into a highly 
regulated one any more than laws and rules convert the use of high-
ways, sidewalks, public water supplies, or household garbage pickup 
into highly regulated activities. If all that the state must demonstrate 
under Art. I, § 23 is that laws and rules exist in an area of human 
activity, then most activities would not be accorded protection under 
Art. I, § 23. Such an approach would undermine the distinction be-
tween highly regulated attorneys and less regulated "tradesmen and 
businessmen" made by the Florida Bar Examiners222 court. The court 
allowed the Florida Bar Examiners to probe the medical history of an 
attorney candidate because such a person is entering an occupation 
with special responsibilities, different from most other service workers. 
The closest the Department of Revenue regulatory activity can be 
compared to that of the Florida Board of Bar Examiners or the Divi-
sion of Pari-Mutuel Wagering would be the discovery of tax evasion. 
However, tax evaders do not have the same effect as dishonest attorneys 
or racehorse owners. The public suffers when people evade taxes, but 
tax evasion is not the same as corruption or dishonesty in a highly 
regulated activity or service industry. Taxpayers are not required to 
undergo the rigorous scrutiny of licensing or a permit process before 
they are allowed to pay their taxes. Taxpayers do not share the special 
role in society assigned to professionals such as attorneys who "are es-
219. See Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutual Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1985). 
220. See supra notes 149-151 and accompanying text. 
221. See Cope, To Be Let Alone: Florida's Proposed Right of Privacy, supra note 83, at 
479. See also supra notes 103-106 and accompanying text. 
222. 443 So. 2d 71, 74 (Fla. 1983). 
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sential to the primary governmental function of administering justice 
and have historically been 'officers of the courts.' "223 The search for 
tax evaders may protect society in a general sense, but can not be said 
to protect against the potential dangers in a regulated business such as 
the pari-mutuel industry. The Florida pari-mutuel regulatory scheme 
works inter alia to "preserve the integrity of the sport of racing from 
corruption, to keep the wagering public from being misled, to reduce 
the risk of injury and to protect the animals from cruel and inhumane 
treatment. "224 
The Department of Revenue may collect data on taxpayers from 
stockbrokers or the IRS only if there is reasonable founded suspicion to 
believe that a particular taxpayer is cheating. Such activity is criminal 
conduct;2211 therefore, the taxpayer is not shielded by the right of pri-
vacy from the data collection procedures of the Department of Revenue. 
To allow the Department of Revenue to collect data on every taxpayer 
as a matter of standard procedure violates the privacy right require-
ment that an agency "accomplishes its goals through the use of the least 
intrusive means."226 Not every taxpayer cheats and the Department of 
Revenue cannot violate a basic constitutional right on vague and gener-
alized suspicions about widespread cheating. The Department of Reve-
nue may be hampered in its investigatory procedures, and probably will 
find it difficult to assure individual compliance with the Intangible Per-
sonal Property Tax Act without routine reports from stockbrokers and 
the IRS. However, the price of making it easy for the Department of 
Revenue to do its job is to disregard a constitutional provision "provid-
ing an explicit textual foundation for those privacy interests inherent in 
the concept of liberty which may not otherwise be protected by specific 
constitutional provisions. " 227 
VI. FLORIDA PRIVACY PROTECTION AS A MonEL FOR OTHER 
STATES 
This article has examined how Florida's state constitutional pn-
vacy provision applies to a routine government function, the collection 
of taxes. Florida's constitutional provision is a model that could prove 
useful to other states. The federal constitution is weakening as a protec-
223. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) quoted in Florida Board of Bar 
Examiners Re: Applicant, 443 So. 2d 71, 75 (Fla. 1983). 
224. Simmons v. Division of Pari-Mutuel, 407 So. 2d 269, 271 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), 
affd, 412 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 1982). 
225. See supra notes 127-129 and accompanying text. 
226. 477 So. 2d at 547; Shaktman v. State of Florida, 14 FLA. L. WEEKLY 522, 523 (Fla. 
1989). 
227. Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 536 (Fla. 1987). 
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tion of privacy as the United States Supreme Court retreats from Roe 
v. Wade228 in Bowers v. Hardwick229 and Webster v. Reproductive 
Health Services. 230 At the same time, state constitutions are being revi-
talized as sources of individual rights and protections. 231 Privacy is a 
prime area in which state constitutions have a critical role providing 
protection from government interference. 232 A few states join Florida in 
including express privacy provisions in their state constitutions. 233 On 
the other hand, a few state courts have implied a privacy right in state 
constitutional provisions that fail explicitly to protect privacy.234 As the 
state constitutional law movement expands and the U.S. Supreme 
Court becomes less protective of privacy interests, more states may 
want to consider adopting constitutional provisions like Art. I, § 23. 
Florida is in the forefront of protecting privacy based on its state 
constitution. Even the emotionally charged and highly debated right to 
choose an abortion is protected by Art. I, § 23. 2311 If the right to choose 
an abortion and to withdraw medical treatment236 are protected under 
Art. I, § 23, then a variety of human activity including paying taxes is 
covered by the Florida constitutional privacy rights. As a result, Florida 
provides a state constitutional laboratory for the nation. The rationale 
of the Florida courts should be helpful in aiding scholars, practitioners 
and jurists in other states in developing law under their state constitu-
tions. The challenge will be to develop state constitutional privacy law 
that is meaningful in the everyday lives of people. Paying taxes, driving 
and using public services are the means by which people relate to their 
state and local governments. Placing limits on the powers of state and 
local governments in obtaining personal information will secure indi-
vidual liberty. The Florida constitution provides a model by which all 
228. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
229. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
230. 109 S.Ct. 3040 (1989). 
231. See, e.g., Howard, The Renaissance of State Constitutional Law, 1 EMERGING IssuEs 
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the "New Federalism", 8 U. PuGET SouND L. REv. vi (1984); Linde, E Pluribus-
Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REV. 165 (1984); Williams, In the Supreme 
Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 
S.C.L. REV. 353 (1984). 
232. See Kempic, The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment Under the State Constitutions, 5 
CooLEY L. REv. 313 (1988). 
233. See ALASKA CoNST. art. I, § 22; CAL. CoNST. art. I, § 1; HAw. CoN ST. art. I, § 5; and 
MoNT. CoNST. art. II, § 10. 
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235. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989). 
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state governments can ensure that the liberty of their residents is 
protected. 
VII. CoNCLUSION 
Art. I, § 23, Florida's state constitutional right of privacy, prohib-
its the Department of Revenue from requiring stockbrokers to report 
client financial information and from using information received about 
individual taxpayers from the IRS unless the Department of Revenue 
has probable cause to believe that a taxpayer is violating the Intangible 
Personal Property Tax Act. The right of privacy yields only when a 
state agency needs to collect data in order to regulate specific activity 
for which individuals volunteer or when there is criminal activity. Tax-
paying is not the kind of regulatory activity for which the state can 
show a compelling need to regulate and require disclosure of data. 
Taxpaying is not criminal activity unless a taxpayer disobeys the tax 
act. For the right of privacy to yield when the Department of Revenue 
must do no more than demonstrate its job will be made more difficult 
means that the state constitutional right of privacy is no longer a basic 
right that requires the state to meet the burden of a strict scrutiny test. 
